Monoposony Models of Frictional Labor Market

704 Macroeconomic Theory II

Topic 7

Masao Fukui

Firms as Wage-Setters

- Now we go back to random search models
- In DMP, workers and firms bargain over wages
- Are wages really bargained in the data?

Hall and Krueger (2012)

- Survey 1,300 workers
- **Q:** When you were offered your job, did your employer make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer or was there some bargaining that took place over the pay?

  A: 33% bargained

  - 25% for women. 85% for professional degree. 6% for blue-color workers.

- **Q:** At the time that you were first interviewed for your job, did you already know exactly how much it would pay?

  A: 23% yes

  - 23% for women. 14% for professional degree. 57% for blue-color workers.

Wage Posting

- In the data, the majority of workers receive "take-it-or-leave-it" offers
- Now let us replace wage bargaining with wage posting in DMP

	Wage Bargaining	**Wage Posting**
Random Search	DMP	**Today**
Directed Search		Competitive Search (Moen, 1997)

Diamond (1971) Paradox

DMP with Wage Posting

- Consider the DMP model in continuous time with discount rate $r > 0$
- To focus on the wage settings, let us assume q and f are both exogenous
- The unemployed workers value function:

$$rU = b + f\max\{E(w) - U, 0\}$$

- The employed workers:

$$rE(w) = w + s(U - E(w))$$

- Workers accept the job offer if $w \geq w^R$, where $E(w^R) = U$

Extreme Monopsony

- Firms decide what wages to offer to workers:

$$rV = -c + \max_{w} q\mathbb{1}(w \geq w^R)J(w)$$
$$rJ(w) = z - w + s(V - J(w))$$

- What is the firm's optimal wage setting? Clearly,

$$w = w^R$$

  since there is no reason to offer $w > w^R$

- Solving for w^R, the unique equilibrium features all firms offering

$$w = w^R = b$$

- Firms set wages so that workers are exactly indifferent to unemployment – an extreme form of "monopsony"

Heterogenous Firms

- The result extends even when firms have differing productivity $z_i \in \{z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_J\}$
- Workers problem unchanged
- Firms with productivity z_i solves

$$rV_i = -c + \max_{w_i} q\mathbb{I}(w_i \geq w^R)J_i(w_i)$$
$$rJ_i(w_i) = z_i - w_i + s(V_i - J_i(w_i))$$

- Despite firm heterogeneity,

$$w_i = w^R = b \quad \text{for all } i$$

Diamond Paradox

- This is called Diamond (1971) Paradox
- Why is this a paradox? Why is this surprising?
- A tiny deviation from perfect competition results in an extreme form of monopsony!
- Firms capture all the rents even when $f, q \to \infty$
- This spurred subsequent research. Solutions to the paradox:
  1. Heterogenous workers (Albrecht and Axell, 1984)
  2. Multiple job applications at a time (Burdett and Judd, 1983)
  3. On-the-job search (Burdett and Mortensen, 1998)
- We focus on Burdett and Mortensen (1998)

On-the-Job Search in the Data



Burdett and Mortensen (1998) Model

Environment

- Let us introduce on-the-job to the previous model
- Unemployed workers receive job-offer at the arrival rate f^U
- Employed workers receive at a rate $f^E \equiv \zeta f^U$
- Firms with measure $m \equiv 1$ post v vacancy (exogenous) and meets worker at rate q
- Firms post wage w that applies to all employees ("firm-wage")
- Start from homogenous firm case with common productivity z
- In the background, think of a matching function that determines (f^U, f^E, q):

$$f^U = \frac{M(u+\zeta(1-u), v)}{u+\zeta(1-u)}, \quad f^E = \zeta \frac{M(u+\zeta(1-u), v)}{u+\zeta(1-u)}, \quad q = \frac{M(u+\zeta(1-u), v)}{v}$$

Worker's Problem

- Unemployed workers value function:

$$rU = b + f^U \int \left[\max\{E(w) - U, 0\}\right] dG(w) \tag{1}$$

- Employed workers with wage w:

$$rE(w) = w + f^E \int \max\{E(w') - E(w), 0\} dG(w') - s(E(w) - U) \tag{2}$$

- Worker's policy:
  - Unemployed: accept job offer iff $w \geq w^R$ where $E(w^R) = U$
  - Employed: accept job offer iff $w' \geq w$

Reservation Wage $\underline{w}$

- Combining $E(w^R) = U$, (1), and (2),

$$
\begin{aligned}
w^R - b &= (f^U - f^E) \int_{w^R} (E(w) - U) dG(w) \\
&= (f^U - f^E) \int_{w^R} E'(w)(1 - G(w)) dw \\
&= (f^U - f^E) \int_{w^R} \frac{1 - G(w)}{r + s + f^E(1 - G(w))} dw
\end{aligned}
$$

  where the second line uses integration by parts

- When $f^U = f^E$, $w^R = b$
- When $f^U > f^E$, $w^R > b$ because accepting a job offer lowers future job opportunity

Worker Flow

- The unemployment flow equation is

$$\dot{u} = -f^U u + s(1-u)$$

- In the steady state,

$$u = \frac{s}{s + f^U}$$

- Let $\hat{H}(w)$ be the mass of employed workers with wages below w, which follows

$$\dot{\hat{H}}(w) = f^U G(w) u - [s + f^E(1 - G(w))]\hat{H}(w)$$

- In the steady state,

$$\hat{H}(w) = \frac{f^U G(w) u}{s + f^E(1 - G(w))}$$

- Let $H(w)$ be the cdf of wage distribution among employed.

$$H(w) = \frac{\hat{H}(w)}{1-u} = \frac{sG(w)}{s + f^E(1 - G(w))}$$

Labor Supply Function

- Employment at a firm offering wage $w \geq w^R$ evolves

$$\dot{l}(w) = qv(\chi + (1-\chi)H(w)) - sl(w) - f^E l(w)(1 - G(w))$$

  where $\chi \equiv u/(u + \zeta(1-u)) = s/(s + f^E)$ is prob. of meeting u conditional on meeting

- In the steady state

$$l(w) = \frac{qv(\chi + (1-\chi)H(w))}{s + f^E(1 - G(w))}$$
$$= \frac{qvs}{(s + f^E(1 - G(w)))^2}$$

- $l(w)$ is increasing in w: higher $w \Rightarrow$ poach more and poached less

Search Friction as a source of Monopsony Power

- To simplify our life, let $r \to 0$ so that the firms maximize the steady-state profit
- The firms solve

$$\max_{w} (z - w) l(w)$$

  - At this point, this is a typical “monoposny” problem:
    $\Rightarrow$ firms face an upward-sloping labor supply curve.
  - Search frictions give you a full microfoundation of $l(w)$
  - Other microfoundations:
    - Job differentiation
    - A finite number of firms (“Oligopsony”)

Frictional Wage Dispersion

- Since all firms are homogenous, tempted to think we have a symmetric eqm
- Suppose all firms offer $w = \hat{w} \in [w^R, z)$
- Then, a firm can profitably deviate by offering $\hat{w} + \epsilon$
  - The cost of doing so is continuous in ϵ
  - But it attracts a discontinuously larger amount of workers
    - The firm can poach all workers
    - No other firms can poach workers from the firm
- All firms offering $\hat{w} \geq z$ cannot be an eqm because $w = z - \epsilon$ gives higher profits
- Therefore, equilibrium has to be a mixed-strategy equilibrium
  $\Rightarrow$ "Frictional wage dispersion"

Smooth Wage Distribution

More generally,

1. There cannot be a mass point

2. There cannot be a gap



Smooth Wage Distribution

More generally,

1. There cannot be a mass point

2. There cannot be a gap



Smooth Wage Distribution

More generally,

1. There cannot be a mass point

2. There cannot be a gap



Wage Offer Distribution

- Firms with the lowest wage offer must find it optimal to offer w^R
- All the other firms must be indifferent to offering w^R, implying

$$(z - w)l(w) = (z - w^R)l(w^R) \quad \text{for all } w \text{ in the support of } G$$

- Since $l(w^R) = qvs/(f^E + s)^2$, $G(w)$ must satisfy

$$G(w) = (1 + s/f^E)\left(1 - \sqrt{\frac{(z - w)}{(z - w^R)}}\right) \quad \text{for } w \in [w^R, \bar{w}], \quad \text{where} \quad G(\bar{w}) = 1$$

- Plug back to the definition of $H(w)$:

$$H(w) = \frac{s}{f^E}\left(\sqrt{\frac{(z - w^R)}{(z - w)}} - 1\right)$$

Numerical Example



Numerical Example ($f^E \to \infty$)



Numerical Example ($f^E \to 0$)



Heterogenous Firms

Heterogenous Firm Setup

- Now suppose the firm's productivity distribution is continuous and given by $J_0(z)$
- Firms with $z \leq w^R$ cannot make profits so inactive. Let $J(z) \equiv \dfrac{J_0(z) - J_0(w^R)}{1 - J_0(w^R)}$
- Firms with $z \geq w^R$ solve

$$\max_w (z - w)l(w) \qquad (\star)$$

- The first-order condition is ($\epsilon_w \equiv l'(w)w/l(w)$)

$$\underbrace{\frac{z-w}{w}}_{\text{wage markdown}} = \underbrace{\frac{1}{\epsilon_w}}_{\text{inv. LS elasticitiy}} \Rightarrow (z-w)\frac{2f^E G'(w)}{(s + f^E(1 - G(w)))} = 1$$

- At this point, what do we know about $G(w)$? – Nothing… big fixed point problem!

Rank-Preserving Property

- Realize that $(\star)$ is strictly supermodular in (z, w)
  $\Rightarrow w(z)$ is strictly increasing in z

- Then we know a lot about $G(w)$

$$G(w(z)) = J(z)$$

$$\Rightarrow \quad G'(w(z))w'(z) = J'(z)$$

- It is this **rank-preserving property** that makes all the job-ladder models tractable
  - More productive firms poach from less productive firms

Solving for Wage Function

- Combine with FOCs to obtain an ODE that characterizes the equilibrium wage

$$w'(z) = (z - w(z)) \frac{2f^E J'(z)}{s + f^E(1 - J(z))}$$

- Solving the ODE with boundary condition $w(w^R) = w^R$

$$w(z) = z - \int_{w^R}^{z} \frac{\left(s + f^E(1 - J(z))\right)^2}{\left(s + f^E(1 - J(\tilde{z}))\right)^2} d\tilde{z}$$

- One can check the second-order condition is also satisfied

Numerical Example



Wage Distribution

Spillover Effect of Minimum Wage

– Engbom and Moser (2021)

Earnings Inequality and Minimum Wage in Brazil



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Minimum Wage Spillover

- Interpret $\underline{w}$ as the minimum wage
- Suppose we raise $\underline{w}$. What would happen to the wage distribution?



Falling Inequality at the Bottom

A. Histogram of log wages, 1996 B. Histogram of log wages, 2018 C. Percentile ratios, 1996–2018



Notes: Panels A and B show histograms of log wages in multiples of the current minimum wage based on 60 equispaced bins for population of male workers aged 18–54 for 1996 and 2018, respectively. Panel C plots lower- and upper-tail wage inequality, as measured by the P50/P10 and the P90/P50 log wage percentile ratios between 1996 and 2018, normalized to 1.0 in 1996. *Source:* RAIS, 1996–2018.

Data versus Model

$$\ln w_{st}^{p} - \ln w_{st}^{90} = \beta^{p}[\ln w_{st}^{\min} - \ln w_{st}^{90}] + \gamma_{s}^{p} + \delta_{s}^{p} \times t + \epsilon_{st}^{p}$$

B. Relative to P90





Impact of Minimum Wage on Inequality



FIGURE 9. IMPACT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE THROUGHOUT THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION IN THE MODEL

- Increases in MW account for 45% of the reduction in Var($\ln w$) over 1996-2018

Reallocation Effect of Minimum Wage

– Dutsman, Linder, Schönberg, Umkehrer, and Berge (2022)

Reallocation Effect of Minimum Wage

- # of matches: $M\left(u + \zeta(1-u), v(1 - J_0(\underline{w})\right)$
- $\underline{w} \uparrow$ implies $q \uparrow$ for firms with $z \geq \underline{w}$
- The effects will be further amplified once we endogenize vacancy creation, v

Minimum Wage Policy in Germany

- Jan 2015: first introduction of minimum wage, €8.5
  - 15% of workers earn below €8.5 in 2014

- Ask:
  1. how are workers earning below €8.5 impacted relative to those above?
  2. how are regions with more binding workers impacted relative to those with less?

Wage and Employment Effect

Wage



(B) Two-Year Hourly Wage Growth by Initial Wage Bin, relative to 2011 vs 2013

Employment



(B) Employment Probablity in Year *t* by Initial Wage Bin, relative to 2011 versus 2013

Reallocation Toward "Good" Firms



(A) Establishment's Average Daily Wage



(B) Establishment's High-Skilled Employment Share



(C) Establishment's Full-Time Employment Share



(D) Establishment's Marginal Employment Share

Wage and Employment Effect at the Region Level

$$y_{m,h} - y_{m,2014} = \beta_h \times \text{(Fraction binding in 2014 in market m)} + \gamma_h' \mathbf{X}_m + \epsilon_{m,h}$$



(B) Detrended Proxied Hourly Wages



(D) Detrended Employment

Reallocation at Regional Level



(C) Average Establishment Size



(D) Average AKM Establishment Fixed Effects



(E) Exit of Small Businesses (1-2 Employees)



(F) Revenue per Worker

Taking Stock

- Burdett-Mortensen model with wage-posting instead of bargaining
    - Tractable framework with many empirical predictions

- However, we have restricted the contract space significantly
    - firms offer a single wage to all workers
    - why not wage-tenure contracts?
    - why not counteroffer?

- Active research going on how firms set wages