

# The Impact of Central Bank Stock Purchases: Evidence from Discontinuities in Policy Rules\*

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## Abstract

We trace the impact of central bank stock purchases by exploiting discontinuity in the Bank of Japan's policy rule, which triggers purchases when stock market index movements in the morning session fall below a certain threshold. In normal times, the purchases persistently raise the long-term interest rate while leaving no detectable impact on stock prices. After the introduction of yield curve control by the Bank of Japan, which pegs the long-term interest rate to 0%, interest rates stopped responding and stock prices sharply and persistently rise following the purchases. While these results support a model where the stock market is substantially inelastic, taking into account an even more inelastic bond market is crucial to account for our empirical findings. Existing estimates, which do not take into account inelasticity in the bond market, substantially understate the true inelasticity in the stock market.

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# 1 Introduction

How does a financial flow into the stock market impact asset prices? While textbook models predict almost no effect, the inelastic stock market hypothesis recently proposed by [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#) argues for a large effect on stock prices. Answering this question goes a long way toward understanding the source of asset price volatility and the effectiveness of central bank asset purchase programs. In fact, as a new form of “quantitative easing,” the Bank of Japan (henceforth BoJ) started to purchase stocks in 2010. At the end of 2020, the BoJ owns more than 6% of the stock market capitalization, becoming the largest owner of Japanese stocks worldwide by 2021. The BoJ explains that the primary goal of this extreme form of quantitative easing is to “reduce the risk premium,” but its effectiveness is often subject to policy debates.

The reason why this question is difficult to answer is the endogeneity of financial flows. No hedge fund randomizes when trading financial assets, and the central bank intervenes in the financial market for a reason. For example, the hedge fund might put money into the stock market when it believes the stock market will perform well, or the BoJ might purchase stocks when the stock market performs poorly. Using these kinds of variations in financial flows will give misleading answers to the question because of reverse causality.

In this paper, we address this challenge by exploiting discontinuities in the BoJ’s policy rules. Although the BoJ has never made it public, it is widely known that the BoJ tends to purchase stocks precisely on the day when the changes in the stock market index in the morning session fall below a certain threshold. By comparing days when the movements in a stock market index fall slightly below the threshold and slightly above, the discontinuous increase in inflow into the stock market can be viewed as orthogonal to the underlying economic fundamentals. A difficulty in implementing the standard regression discontinuity design in our setup is that the threshold is not necessarily known, as the BoJ has never made the policy rule public. We overcome this problem by estimating the threshold relying on the econometric literature on regression discontinuity design with unknown cutoffs ([Porter and Yu, 2015](#)). Indeed, we find a striking discontinuity in the likeli-

hood of the intervention around the estimated cutoffs.

Exploiting the discontinuity in the policy rules, we first show that flows into stock markets have a large causal impact on *both* the stock prices and the long-term government bond interest rates. In response to an average size of intervention, which amounts to 0.01% of stock market capitalization, our estimates indicate that the stock prices rise by around 0.1-0.4% following the intervention. Perhaps more surprisingly, the 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) yield also rises by around 0.5 basis points (b.p.). Although the standard errors increase, these results appear to be persistent, lasting at least several days.

We then argue that the above results mask a stark underlying heterogeneity that depends on the presence of another unconventional monetary policy, yield curve control (YCC). In the middle of 2016, the BoJ pegged the 10-year JGB yield at 0%. Since then, long-term interest rates have stabilized at around 0%. Given this, it is natural to expect the response of long-term interest rates to the financial flows to be different before and after the introduction of the YCC, and we find that this is indeed the case.

Specifically, before the introduction of the YCC, in response to the BoJ's stock market purchases, the long-term interest rates rise sharply and persistently following the intervention, while leaving virtually no detectable impact on the stock price. Quantitatively, we find that long-term interest rates rise by 1.0-1.5 b.p. in response to the average size of the intervention. In contrast, we cannot reject the null that the BoJ's stock purchases left no impact on stock prices in the following days, although the standard errors are large.

After the introduction of the YCC, the long-term interest rate entirely stopped responding, and instead, stock prices rise sharply and persistently in response to the BoJ's stock purchases. The effect on the long-term interest rate is precisely estimated at zero, suggesting that the yield curve control successfully stabilizes the long-term interest rate. The stock price responds by around 0.2-0.4% in response to the typical size of the intervention, which persists for several days after the intervention.

In the final part of the paper, we present a model with inelastic financial mar-

kets that is fully consistent with our empirical results. We argue existing models that feature inelasticity only in the stock market or in the bond market are inconsistent with our empirical findings. We show that our empirical results uniquely support a model in which the stock market is inelastic and the bond market is even *more* inelastic. Existing estimates of stock market inelasticity, which ignore inelasticity in the bond market, substantially understates the true inelasticity.

There are two assets in the model: stocks and bonds, where the latter includes all money-like assets that are liquid and risk-free.<sup>1</sup> Our model nests a case where only the stock market is inelastic, as in [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#). In this simple case, a central bank stock purchase always raises the stock prices while leaving the bond interest rate unchanged. This is because the bond market is perfectly elastic, where households' Euler equation pins down the interest rate irrespective of the financial flows. Consequently, this simple case fails to account for the response of interest rates to financial flows that we see in the data. Our model also nests a case where only the bond market is inelastic ([Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012](#)). While this class of models can match the interest rate responses, they fail to account for the strong stock price responses under the yield curve control.

To fully account for our empirical findings, we consider a general case in which both the stock and bond markets are inelastic. Households have a downward-sloping demand for the liquidity services that bonds provide, which breaks the neutrality of financial flows in the interest rate determination. In this environment, a flow from bonds to stocks puts upward pressure on not only stock prices but also bond interest rates (an inverse of the bond price). The latter effect attenuates or can even reverse the rise in stock prices resulting from the inflow into the stock market.

We structurally estimate the parameters that govern the inelasticity in financial markets to fit our empirical evidence. Our parameter estimates indicate substantial inelasticity in the stock market, but even more inelasticity in the bond market. As a result, when interest rates flexibly adjust, an inflow into the stock market raises the interest rate without raising the stock price, consistent with what we find in

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<sup>1</sup>In the model, we do not make a distinction between money and bonds. This is a valid assumption if the elasticity of substitution between near-money assets like bonds and money is high, which is empirically the case ([Nagel, 2016](#); [Krishnamurthy and Li, 2023](#)).

the data. In the presence of yield curve control, which we model as the central bank adjusting the supply of bonds to fix the interest rate, the only consequence of a flow from bonds to stocks is a substantial increase in the stock price, again consistent with our empirical evidence.

Through the lens of the model, we argue that existing estimates, which do not take into account inelasticity in the bond market, substantially understate the true inelasticity in the stock market. To make this point, we re-estimate the parameters of our model assuming researchers misspecify that bond markets are perfectly elastic. We find that such researchers would underestimate the inelasticity in the stock market by a factor of five. This highlights the importance of taking into account inelasticity in both the stock and bond markets, even when researchers are only interested in one of the two markets. It also provides empirical support for the theoretical arguments in [Fuchs et al. \(2023\)](#) that taking into account cross-asset spillovers is crucial to uncover the true elasticity.

Even if one moves away from the specific model we consider, our empirical results provide two portable statistics that can discipline theoretical models that incorporate inelastic financial markets. First, when interest rates flexibly adjust, a purchase of 1% of stock market capitalization raises the long-term interest rate by around 1 percentage point but leaves no significant impact on stock prices. Second, whenever interest rates are fixed, the same flow raises the stock price by around 20%. The first statistic challenges the implicit assumption in the existing literature that the bond market is more elastic relative to the stock market. The second statistic is four times higher than the estimates in [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#), suggesting that the stock market may be more inelastic than previously thought. We failed to detect it in times with flexible interest rate adjustments because it was masked by the presence of an even more inelastic bond market.

Our results are crucial in understanding the consequences of unconventional monetary policy which is increasingly becoming the dominant tool of modern monetary policy. Our estimates on bond market inelasticity are consistent with substantial bond market frictions that are likely to amplify the effects of typical quantitative easing, which involves purchases of long-term bonds. Moreover, as

unconventional monetary policies become increasingly important, other central banks may follow in the footsteps of the Bank of Japan in purchasing not only bonds but also stocks. Since most central banks do not intervene in the stock market, evidence of the effects of such policies is very limited. Our results suggest that this policy has far-reaching impacts on the financial markets. In particular, the result shows that interventions in the stock market have effects on prices beyond the stock market – the yield curve may react in important ways.

## Related Literature

We build most directly on the pioneering work by [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#) in assessing how a flow from bonds to stocks impacts the financial market. [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#) and a growing number of studies (e.g., [Da et al., 2018](#); [Hartzmark and Solomon, 2023](#); [Li et al., 2021](#); [Parker et al., 2023](#)) estimate how the flows from bonds to stocks affect stock prices using various identification strategies. Our contributions to this literature are twofold. First, we argue that from both empirical and theoretical perspectives, it is important to consider how bond prices are affected by such flows. On the empirical front, we provide evidence that such flows raise interest rates, which counteracts the upward pressure on stock prices.<sup>2</sup> On the theoretical front, we show that jointly taking into account inelasticity in the bond market is necessary to account for our empirical findings and to recover the true inelasticity in the stock market. Second, we propose a novel identification strategy relying on discontinuity in the Bank of Japan’s policy rules. An advantage of our approach is that it transparently points toward the source of identification and the underlying assumptions.

To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to identify the aggregate effect of the Bank of Japan’s central stock purchases.<sup>3</sup> Many studies exploit the difference in weights in the BoJ’s purchase basket to identify relative price impacts on stocks with larger versus smaller weights ([Barbon and Gianinazzi, 2019](#);

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<sup>2</sup>Recent work by [Caballero et al. \(2024\)](#) also shows that a flow from bonds to stocks has a positive impact on interest rates.

<sup>3</sup>In fact, [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#) write “We are not aware of a quantification of the macro elasticity for Japan” (footnote 68).


Charoenwong et al., 2021; Harada and Okimoto, 2021; Adachi et al., 2021; Katagiri et al., 2022). In contrast, our empirical strategy allows us to focus on the aggregate effect. In this regard, various studies (Shirota, 2018; Fukuda and Tanaka, 2022; Chung, 2020; Hattori and Yoshida, 2023) assume selection on observables and use the unexplained policy variation that remains after conditioning on observables to identify the aggregate effect.<sup>4</sup> However, it is difficult to rule out the presence of unobservables that simultaneously affect the financial market performance and the likelihood of BoJ intervention. Our identification assumptions, which only require continuity of economic fundamentals with respect to stock price changes in the morning session, are substantially weaker than those of these studies.

More broadly, we contribute to the large literature studying the effect of the central bank asset purchases, so-called “quantitative easing” (e.g., Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Droste et al., 2021; Selgrad, 2023). These studies have focused on central bank purchases of long-term government bonds or mortgage-backed securities, which are swaps between one type of bond (e.g., long-term bonds) with another (e.g., reserves). Our focus is conceptually different from these because central bank stock purchases are swaps between stocks and bonds.

While there are many studies to isolate quasi-experimental variation in monetary policy (e.g., Romer and Romer, 1989; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002; Angrist et al., 2018; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018), our approach is unique in exploiting the discontinuity in the policy rule. The closest to our approach is the one in Kuersteiner, Phillips, and Villamizar-Villegas (2018), who also use a discontinuous policy rule to investigate the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange interventions in Colombia. Our approach differs not only in terms of the empirical context but also in methodology, as we use the technique of regression discontinuity with unknown discontinuity points (Porter and Yu, 2015).

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<sup>4</sup>Relatedly, Ichiue (2024) estimates how the size of the BoJ’s stock holdings affects stock market performance.



**Figure 1:** Cumulative ETF Purchases by the BoJ

*Notes:* Figure 1 plots the cumulative amount of stock purchases by the BoJ from 2010 to 2020 as a fraction of stock market capitalization.

## 2 Data

Our primary goal is to measure the impact of an inflow into the stock market induced by central bank stock purchases. We focus on the period from October 2010, the start of the BoJ stock market intervention, to the end of 2020. The BoJ purchases Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) indexed to stock market indexes in Japan. We do not distinguish between ETFs and stocks and use them interchangeably. We obtain the dates and amounts of stock purchases for each of the BoJ’s interventions from the BoJ website.<sup>5</sup> Figure 1 shows the cumulative amount of ETF purchases over time. The BoJ started the stock market purchases in December 2010 as a new form of quantitative easing. By the end of 2020, the BoJ held over 6% of the stock market capitalization in Japan. The average size of each intervention is roughly 500 million USD, corresponding to 0.01% of the stock market capitalization. The total number of interventions during our sample period is 668. The amount of ETF purchases is normalized by the stock market capitalization, which we obtained from the Japan Exchange Group Data Cloud.

The BoJ publishes the amount of ETF purchases on the morning of the day following the intervention. Based on the trading volume, it is widely believed

<sup>5</sup>[https://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/menu\\_etf.htm](https://www3.boj.or.jp/market/jp/menu_etf.htm)



that the BoJ submits an order at lunchtime, although the BoJ has never made this practice public.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, investors potentially face uncertainty about whether the large inflow into the stock market reflects the BoJ’s intervention or other factors within the day of the intervention. For this reason, we prefer to use our empirical estimates on the next day as our benchmark estimates.

To measure the response of the stock market, we use tick-by-tick data on the Tokyo Stock Price Index (henceforth, TOPIX), which is the index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in Japan, tracking all domestic companies of the exchange’s first section. We obtain these data from the Japan Exchange Group Data Cloud. To measure the response of the long-term interest rate, we use the tick-by-tick Japanese Government Bond yield data, which we obtained from Refinitiv Japan. Since some observations are missing in the Refinitiv data, we supplement those missing observations with the tick-by-tick data from Bloomberg.<sup>7</sup>

### 3 Empirical Strategy

We consider the following econometric model:

$$\Delta y_{t+l,h} = \beta_{l,h} \times ETF_t + \Gamma'_{l,h} \mathbf{X}_t + \epsilon_{t+l,h}, \quad (1)$$

where  $\Delta y_{t+l,h} \equiv y_{t+l,h} - y_{t,0}$  is the change in the variable  $y$  (e.g. the log of stock prices) from the end price of the morning session ( $h = 0$ ) on day  $t$  to time  $h$  on day  $t + l$ ,  $ETF_t$  is the amount of stock market purchases by the BoJ relative to the stock market capitalization of Japan,  $\mathbf{X}_t$  is the vector of controls, and  $\epsilon_{t+l,h}$  contains the unmodeled determinants of the outcome variable. We are interested in estimating  $\beta_{l,h}$ , which measures the impact of the central bank’s stock purchases at time  $h$  on  $l$  days after day  $t$ . We choose this simple linear model for expositional purposes. In Appendix A.1, we consider a non-linear model of (1) and present more technical interpretation of the estimated parameter as in Angrist and Imbens (1995). In the

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<sup>6</sup>See Harada and Okimoto (2021), for example.

<sup>7</sup>The results are very similar when we use only the data from either Refinitiv or Bloomberg. The two datasets, when they overlap, are highly correlated with each other, with  $R^2$  exceeding 99.98%.

baseline specification, we do not include any controls  $\mathbf{X}_t$ , but we show robustness to adding various controls in Section 4.4.

An obvious concern with estimating the equation (1) by OLS is reverse causality. For example, one might expect that the central bank is more likely to intervene when the stock market is performing poorly. This leads to a downward bias in the OLS estimates of  $\beta_{l,h}$ .

To solve this endogeneity problem, we propose an identification strategy based on regression discontinuity design, which builds on the observation that the BoJ's intervention appeared to follow a cut-off rule. It has been widely argued among the media that the BoJ seemed to intervene on the day when the movements in the value of TOPIX fell below a certain threshold in the morning session. For example, the Financial Times writes that "the central bank has tended to step in whenever the TOPIX index has lost more than 0.5 percent in the morning session."<sup>8</sup> In fact, Figure 2 shows that from May to July 2019, the BoJ followed a strict rule to intervene when the stock market index falls more than 0.5% in the morning session. The BoJ intervenes when the index falls slightly below the 0.5% threshold, while it does not intervene when the index falls slightly above the threshold.


Suppose for the moment that such a cut-off is known. Then, we can apply a standard regression discontinuity design. Formally, we assume that the policy rule has the following form:

$$ETF_t = ETF_{-,t}(\Delta p_t)\mathbb{I}(\Delta p_t < c_t) + ETF_{+,t}(\Delta p_t)\mathbb{I}(\Delta p_t \geq c_t), \quad (2)$$

where  $\Delta p_t$  is the log-changes in the TOPIX value in the morning,  $c_t$  is the cut-off,  $ETF_{-,t}$  and  $ETF_{+,t}$  are some random functions of the ETF purchase at day  $t$  that represent different policy rules depending on whether  $\Delta p_t$  is above or below the cutoff. We assume (i)  $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_{t+l,h}|\Delta p_t, \mathbf{X}_t]$  is continuous at  $\Delta p_t = c_t$ , (ii)  $\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t|\Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t]$  and  $\lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t|\Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t]$  exist, and (iii)  $\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t|\Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t] \neq \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t|\Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t]$ . Under these as-

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<sup>8</sup>Financial Times, "Bank of Japan backs away from ETF buying scheme," (March 23, 2021), <https://www.ft.com/content/a654d1c9-7126-4587-8de6-ed15f567455f>.



**Figure 2: An Example of Cutoff Policy Rule**

*Notes:* Figure 2 illustrates the cut-off policy rule by showing the percentage TOPIX changes and the BoJ (Bank of Japan) purchase amount for each day from May 2019 to July 2019. The solid red line shows the TOPIX changes in the morning session, and the dashed red line is the estimated cutoff of 0.5%. The bar shows the amount of purchases for each intervention in billions of Japanese Yen (approximately 10 million US dollars).

sumptions, it follows that

$$\frac{\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[\Delta y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[\Delta y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t]}{\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t | \Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t | \Delta p_t = \Delta p, \mathbf{X}_t]} = \beta_{l,h}. \quad (3)$$

As recommended by [Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw \(2001\)](#) and [Porter \(2003\)](#), we can devise local linear regression estimators for the left-hand side to obtain an estimate of  $\beta_{l,h}$ . [Imbens and Lemieux \(2008\)](#) pointed out that this is numerically equivalent to a two-stage least squares estimator with properly defined instruments and weights. The advantage of their formulation in our context is that it is easy to accommodate heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. We use the optimal bandwidth proposed by [Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik \(2014\)](#) and estimate  $\beta_{l,h}$  using two-stage least squares and report Newey-West standard errors.

The difficulty in implementing the above approach, however, is that the cut-off is not necessarily known. While the cutoffs utilized by the BoJ were apparently known to the public in some periods, it was not known in other periods. In order to formally detect the cutoffs utilized by the BoJ, we estimate the cut-off with the

presumption that the BoJ follows a cut-off rule, following the approach proposed by [Porter and Yu \(2015\)](#). They develop a method to estimate the discontinuity point and show that there is no loss of efficiency with the regression discontinuity estimator using the estimated cutoff. In implementing this approach, we proceed as follows. We first split the sample period to allow time-variation in the policy rule. We assume the cut-off is a constant within the sample split. Then, in each of the sample splits, we consider a set of possible cutoffs,  $\mathbb{C} \equiv \{\bar{c}_1, \bar{c}_2, \dots, \bar{c}_K\}$ . For each  $\bar{c} \in \mathbb{C}$ , we estimate the jump of  $\Pr_t(ETF_t > 0|\Delta p)$  around  $\bar{c}$ , which is

$$J_t(\bar{c}) \equiv \lim_{\Delta p \uparrow \bar{c}} \Pr_t(ETF_t > 0|\Delta p) - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow \bar{c}} \Pr_t(ETF_t > 0|\Delta p).$$


We select  $\bar{c}$  that maximizes square of the jump,  $J_t^2(\bar{c})$ :  $c_t^* \in \arg \max_{\bar{c} \in \mathbb{C}} J_t^2(\bar{c})$ .

We implement the above approach with the following specifications. First, we consider the split of the sample period based on the BoJ's announcements regarding the ETF purchases. The BoJ made six announcements that state the changes in the target amount of ETF purchases in March 4, 2013, October 31, 2014, December 18, 2015, July 29, 2016, July 31, 2018, and March 16, 2020. We further divide each period between the two announcements, based on whether the TOPIX closing price falls relative to the opening price for the last two consecutive days. We make this choice based on widespread claims in the media,<sup>9</sup> and we have indeed found that it has a strong explanatory power. Second, we consider the set of potential cutoffs ranging from  $-1\%$  to  $0\%$  with  $0.05\%$  intervals. We estimate the jump of  $\Pr_t(ETF_t > 0|\Delta p)$  around the potential cutoffs using the local linear regressions with the optimal bandwidth computed from [Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik \(2014\)](#).

Figure 3A shows the path of estimated cutoffs. The estimated cutoffs align well with the widely held consensus. During 2010-2013, it is widely believed that the BoJ followed a so-called "1% rule", in which the BoJ buys ETFs whenever the

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<sup>9</sup>See, for example, Bloomberg article "The BoJ's ETF Purchase Conditions Likely to Ease if Stocks Continue to Fall" (written in Japanese) (<https://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/articles/2020-07-22/-0-3-kcwteezj>).




**Figure 3:** Estimated Cutoffs and Discontinuities around the Cutoffs

*Notes:* Figure 3A plots the path of estimated cutoffs over our sample period. Figure 3B shows the discontinuity in the amount of the BoJ stock purchases in the range of -1% to 1% around the estimated cutoff. Each dot represents the binned scatter plot with 0.1% bin-width and the red line represents the linear fit on each side of the cutoff.

TOPIX falls more than 1% in the morning session,<sup>10</sup> and our estimates confirm this view. Since April 2013, the BoJ appears to use different cutoffs depending on whether the daily change in the TOPIX has been negative for the past two consecutive days. Specifically, when the index has declined for two consecutive days, our estimates show a clear pattern that the BoJ intervenes whenever the TOPIX falls below 0% in the morning session, confirming the claim in the media described earlier. Since March 2018, the cutoffs appear to be 0.5% when there is no consecutive fall in the past two days, which is again consistent with the so-called “0.5% rule.”

Figure 3B shows the binned scatter plot of the size of the BoJ intervention against the changes in the TOPIX in the morning session of the same day relative to the cutoffs. We confirm that there is a discrete jump in the size of the BoJ interventions around zero. The implied jump in the full sample is 0.83% of the market capitalization with a standard error of 0.0005%. The Cragg-Donald F-statistic is 1821, and the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic is 261, eliminating weak identification

<sup>10</sup>For example, Nikkei Asia writes “the BoJ was widely thought to be following an unwritten rule, dubbed the 1% rule: it would buy ETFs when the Topix index of all issues on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell more than 1% in the morning session.” (<https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Finance/BOJ-steps-up-REIT-buying-scales-back-ETF-purchases>)



**Figure 4:** Density around the cutoff

*Notes:* Figure 4 shows the histogram and the density of changes in TOPIX relative to the cutoff. The shaded area is 95% confidence interval. We use the local polynomial density estimator by Cattaneo et al. (2020) with order 2.

concerns. This discontinuity comes from the discontinuity in the likelihood of intervention, with a jump in the probability of intervention of 86% with a standard error of 0.02%. Importantly, we find strong evidence of discontinuity in any split of the sample.<sup>11</sup>

A natural concern for discontinuity-based research design is that whether to fall below the cutoff or not might not be random. For example, to the extent that policy rule is widely known among investors, the optimal responses by investors may induce bunching of stock price changes in the morning session just below the cutoff. Under such manipulation of the stock price changes, the regression discontinuity estimator lacks causal interpretation, as explained in McCrary (2008).

Figure 4 plots the density of stock price changes in the morning session relative to the estimated cutoff. Under manipulation of stock price changes, we would expect bunching of the density in either side of the cutoff. However, we do not observe such bunching. Furthermore, Appendix A.3 formally tests the presence of manipulation using the methodology proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2020). We do

<sup>11</sup>We report the discontinuity for each sample split in Appendix A.2 and Figure B.1. .

not find evidence of manipulation. This supports our assumption that the likelihood of falling below the cutoff is random. This likely reflects the presence of uninformed (“noise”) traders in the financial market, making it difficult for investors to manipulate stock prices.


Another issue, which is unique to time-series setups like ours, is the autocorrelation in the policy shock. The outcome  $y_{t+l,h}$  is affected by the BoJ’s ETF purchases up to  $l$  days later. Therefore, if falling below the cutoff today is correlated with future and past purchases, our empirical estimates cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of the BoJ’s one-time ETF purchases. To address this concern, in Appendix A.4 we test whether falling below a cut-off today is associated with past or future ETF purchases. Figure B.2 shows the estimates of the discontinuity in the amount of ETF purchases at date  $t + l$  around the estimated cutoff at day  $t$ . Reassuringly, we find significant discontinuity only at  $l = 0$ . Thus, the effects we identify are the causal effects of the BoJ’s one-time ETF purchases and are not contaminated by future or past ETF purchases.

## 4 Empirical Results

Armed with the cutoff estimates, we implement the regression discontinuity design to assess the impact of the BoJ’s ETF purchases on the financial market. We report the following three main findings. First, the BoJ’s stock purchases increase both stock prices and long-term interest rates throughout the sample period. Second, in the periods before the BoJ introduced yield curve control, there is no evidence that the intervention increased the stock price, but it robustly increased the long-term interest rate. Third, after the introduction of yield curve control, the long-term interest rate stopped responding, and the stock price sharply and persistently increased following the intervention.

### 4.1 Homogenous Effect for the Entire Sample Periods

As a first look at the data, we examine the presence of discontinuity in our outcome variables around the cutoff that triggers the BoJ’s purchases (i.e., whether



**Figure 5: Discontinuities in Stock Returns and Long-Term Interest Rates**


*Notes:* Figure 5A shows the binned scatter plot of the log changes in TOPIX in the afternoon (from 11AM to 3PM) against the changes in TOPIX in the morning session relative to the cutoff. The bin width is 0.1%. The line represents the best fit from the linear regression. Figure 5B is analogous to Figure 5A, with the vertical axis being the changes in the 10-year JGB Yield in basis point (b.p.) in the afternoon (from 11AM to 3PM).

the numerator in equation (3) is nonzero).

Figure 5A shows the results for stock price changes. Specifically, it reports the binned scatter plot changes in the TOPIX in the afternoon (from 11AM to 3PM) against the changes in the TOPIX in the morning relative to the estimated cut-off. The figure shows that the stock returns were around 0.2 p.p. higher when the TOPIX fell slightly below the cutoff in the morning than when it fell slightly above the cutoff. Since the BoJ's intervention was likely to occur on days when the TOPIX fell below the threshold, and since the BoJ submitted the order to purchase ETF during the lunch break, this suggests that the BoJ's intervention had a large impact on stock prices within the day. The magnitude is large considering that the BoJ purchased on average around 0.01% of market capitalization in each of the interventions.

Figure 5B focuses on the 10-year Japanese government bond yields as an outcome variable. Perhaps surprisingly, we also see a discontinuity in the long-term interest rate. The long-term interest rate is 4 basis points higher on the left side of the cutoff than on the right side. Later, we argue that through the lens of the theoretical model, this evidence is consistent with the notion that the bond market is





**Figure 6:** The Impact on Stock Prices and Long-Term Interest Rates

*Notes:* Figure 6A shows the impulse response function of stock prices by plotting coefficient  $\beta_{l,h}$  in equation (1). The coefficient measures the log changes in stock prices in response to stock purchases of 1% of market capitalization. Figure 6B is analogous to Figure 6A and shows the impulse response of the 10-year JGB yield. The coefficient measures the percentage point changes in the yield in response to stock purchases of 1% of market capitalization. In all figures, the shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals, which account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.

inelastic. Intuitively speaking, central banks swap stocks with liquid risk-free assets. As there are more supplies of liquid risk-free assets in the economy, the prices of such assets (bonds) fall so long as investor demand for bonds is downward-sloping.

All the results so far concern the price changes within a day, and therefore it is possible that the effect disappears on the following days. In addition, the results so far do not take into account the size of the intervention (i.e., it only captures the numerator of equation (3)). In order to translate this into the elasticity estimates,  $\beta_{l,h}$  in equation (1), we need to take into account the volume of ETF purchases (i.e., the denominator in (3)). To systematically evaluate the price impacts relative to ETF purchases as a share of total stock market capitalization over various horizons, we present the regression discontinuity estimators  $\beta_{l,h}$  below.

Figure 6A and 6B plot the impulse response functions of stock prices and bond prices. Formally, we plot estimates of  $\beta_{l,h}$  in equation (1) for each  $l$  and  $h$ , where  $l$  represents the number of days since the intervention and  $h$  represents the time in hours. In Figure 6A, we see an immediate and large stock price response in the

afternoon of the intervention. It implies that a stock purchase of 0.01% of market capitalization, a typical size of the intervention, increases the stock value by 0.4%. This coefficient is statistically significant. Over the next five days, the coefficient is roughly halved and the standard error is larger, but it does not revert back to zero. Reassuringly, we do not find any evidence of pre-trends, which is consistent with our identifying assumptions.

Figure 6B shows that the 10-year JGB yield also rises sharply after the intervention. Moreover, the effect appears to be quite persistent, and it remains statistically significant even five days after the intervention. The magnitude is again substantial. In response to a typical size of the purchases (0.01% of market capitalization), the 10-year JGB yield rises by around 0.4-0.5 basis points.

We have shown that the central bank stock purchases have quantitatively large impacts on both the stock and bond markets. These findings might appear surprising on their own, but even more strikingly, we argue below that these average effects mask an important underlying heterogeneity.

## 4.2 Heterogenous Effects and Yield Curve Control

Figure 6B showed that the stock market purchases are accompanied by the rise in the long-term interest rate. In standard theoretical models, the rise in interest rates puts downward pressure on stock prices. For this reason, we expect that the ability of the interest rate to respond will be a critical determinant of the stock price responses to the central bank stock purchases.

The BoJ's another unconventional policy, the so-called "yield curve control," provides an ideal laboratory to explore this hypothesis. On September 21, 2016, the BoJ introduced an explicit target for the 10-year Japanese government bond yield at 0%. Figure 7 indeed shows that the long-term rate has stabilized at around 0% since the introduction of yield curve control. The daily standard deviation of the long-term rate is 0.37% before the introduction of yield curve control, but it falls to 0.08% after the introduction. If the BoJ does its best to stabilize the long-term interest rate at 0%, we would expect to see a much smaller response of the long-term rate in response to the stock purchases. To test this, we split our sam-



**Figure 7: 10 Year JGB Yield**


*Notes:* Figure 7 shows the path of 10-year JGB (Japanese Government Bond) yield over time, where the red vertical the dashed line (September 21, 2016) denotes the start of the yield curve control.

ple periods before and after the introduction of yield curve control and rerun our analysis.

Figures 8 and 9 show the main results of this paper. Figures 8A and 8B show the impulse response of stock prices before and after the introduction of yield curve control, respectively. Before the introduction of yield curve control, we find no evidence that the stock market responded positively beyond one day to the BoJ intervention, although the standard error is large. In stark contrast, stock prices rise persistently and in a statistically significant manner under yield curve control. Quantitatively, a purchase of 0.01% of stock market capitalization, a typical size of the intervention, causes around a 0.2-0.3% increase in stock prices several days after the intervention.


Figures 9A and 9B explain why. Figures 9A show that the long-term interest rate responds positively before yield curve control. Quantitatively, a purchase of 0.01% of stock market capitalization by the BoJ causes around one base point increase in the long-term rates, and the effect is statistically significant. However, under the yield curve control, long-term rates stopped responding and the effect is precisely estimated as zero. These results imply that the yield curve control was successful in stabilizing the long-term interest rate.

One potential concern here is that the observed heterogeneity may not reflect the causal impact of the yield curve control. For example, it is possible that the effects of the BoJ's policy intervention gradually increased or decreased over time,




**Figure 8: Stock Price Responses before and after Yield Curve Control**

Notes: Figures 8A and 8B show the impulse response of stock prices separately estimated before and after yield curve control, which is analogous to Figure 6A. The shaded areas represent the 90% confidence interval, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.



**Figure 9: Interest Rate Responses before and after Yield Curve Control**

Notes: Figures 9A and 9B show the impulse response of the 10-year JGB yield separately estimated before and after yield curve control, which is analogous to Figure 6B. The shaded areas represent the 90% confidence interval, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.



**Figure 10: Responses Immediately before and after Yield Curve Control Start**  
*Notes:* Figure 10A and 10B show the responses of stock prices (10A) and 10-year JGB yields (10B), divided into two periods relative to the introduction of the YCC on September 21, 2016: (i) more than one year before or after YCC (labeled "> 1yr"), and (ii) within one year of the YCC's introduction (labeled "< 1yr"). The estimates reflect the response to changes from 11 AM on the intervention day to 9 AM the following day. Vertical lines indicate the 90% confidence intervals, which account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.

irrespective of the implementation of the yield curve control. To address this concern, we estimate the effects of the BoJ's stock purchases by focusing on the one-year periods immediately before and after the introduction of the yield curve control. If we observe a stark difference in the impact within this one-year window, it provides stronger evidence that yield curve control, rather than an underlying trend, is driving the observed changes in the heterogeneity of the impact.

Figure 10 plots the estimated next-day responses of the stock price and long-term interest rates, dividing the periods into four subsample periods: more than one year before, less than one year before, less than one year after, and more than one year after the start of the yield curve control. Two observations are in order. First, the strong positive response of stock prices arise shortly after the implementation of the yield curve control, while there is no response shortly before. Second, the long-term interest rates strongly respond shortly before the implementation of the yield curve control, and immediately stop responding shortly after the implementation of the yield curve control.

While standard errors are large, these results strongly support that the notion

that the heterogeneity before and after the implementation of the yield curve control reflects the causal effect of the yield curve control.

### 4.3 Bond Yield Responses Across Different Maturities

We show that the effect on interest rate is not specific to the 10-year JGB yield, but rather is widespread across the entire yield curve.


Figure 9 shows the point estimates of the effect on the JGB yield across maturities of 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, and 30 years. Before yield curve control, yields rose at all maturities, but the effect was larger at longer maturities. Our preferred interpretation is that the zero lower bound on policy rate has been binding during this period, and therefore the shorter-maturity bonds had less room to respond relative to longer-maturity bonds. After yield curve control, all interest rates entirely stopped responding. Although yield curve control was intended to specifically control the 10-year yield, it can prevent the other maturities from responding because they are interconnected through arbitrage. For example, it is the natural prediction of the preferred habitat model of the term structure by [Vayanos and Vila \(2021\)](#).

### 4.4 Robustness

Table 1 conducts a battery of robustness checks and shows that our results are robust to various alternatives to the baseline specifications. In rows 1 and 2, we show that the results are not sensitive to changing the bandwidth of the regression discontinuity estimator.<sup>12</sup> Row 3 uses the quadratic local polynomial regression instead of the linear. Row 4 controls the amount of the BoJ's purchases over the past two days. This addresses the concern that if the stock price changes are likely to fall on one side of the cut-off over consecutive days, our estimator confounds the effect of the past and future interventions. Reassuringly, the results are not sensitive to this control. This is not surprising given that there is no evidence that falling below the cutoff today causes future and past ETF purchases, as we

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<sup>12</sup>Figure B.4 in the Appendix more systematically explores robustness with respect to the choice of bandwidths. We find that the results are virtually unchanged for a wide variation in the bandwidths.



**Figure 11: Response of Other Maturities**

*Notes:* Figure 11 shows the response of the JGB yield across different maturities from 11AM of the day of the intervention to 9AM of the next day. The circle dot represents the point estimates before yield curve control, and the diamond dot represents the point estimates after yield curve control. The coefficient measures the percentage point changes in the JGB Yield in response to the purchase of 1% of market capitalization. The vertical lines represent the 90% confidence interval, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.

formally show in the Appendix A.4. Row 5 and row 6 controls for the past stock market returns and changes in the long-term interest rate over the last two days. Finally, in row 7, we drop observations one week before and after the dates when the cutoff changed. This addresses the concern that the changes in cutoff could be endogenous to the underlying economic fundamentals or the cutoff change may contain signals about future policy stances of the BoJ. Overall, our results appear to be virtually unchanged with various alternative specifications.

## 4.5 Placebo Tests

One might worry that our results are not driven by the discontinuous changes in BoJ's policy intervention, but rather by some other factors such as investors' sentiments that sharply respond to the stock price changes in the morning session. Some investors might employ simple trading strategies that respond *discontinuously* to stock price changes during the morning session, independent of

Panel A. Stock Price Response						
	All		Before YCC		After YCC	
	Same Day	Next Day	Same Day	Next Day	Same Day	Next Day
0. Baseline	34.90 (5.89)	8.65 (10.18)	36.31 (17.50)	-16.95 (26.27)	35.24 (4.68)	22.23 (11.13)
1. Narrower Bandwidth	41.65 (7.16)	16.22 (16.09)	30.14 (22.18)	-21.25 (39.57)	47.26 (7.15)	33.08 (16.25)
2. Wider Bandwidth	29.49 (4.84)	6.07 (9.36)	30.63 (13.46)	-2.44 (20.74)	29.41 (4.69)	15.66 (9.14)
3. Polynomial Order 2	43.40 (7.47)	16.98 (15.64)	41.13 (21.64)	-22.70 (42.42)	47.24 (7.14)	30.63 (14.39)
4. Control Past Interventions	39.50 (8.09)	12.56 (15.10)	54.57 (25.67)	-16.44 (34.04)	37.32 (6.61)	29.65 (14.48)
5. Control Past Stock Returns	34.91 (5.89)	8.62 (10.20)	36.15 (17.70)	-17.33 (26.21)	35.18 (4.77)	20.51 (11.76)
6. Control Past 10-Year Yield	35.96 (5.84)	6.63 (9.94)	40.91 (18.33)	-23.41 (25.42)	35.06 (4.67)	21.90 (11.13)
7. Drop Around the Cutoff Changes	34.96 (6.05)	8.00 (10.92)	31.21 (16.52)	-20.53 (28.22)	35.07 (5.52)	24.56 (12.45)

Panel B. JGB 10-Year Yield Response						
	All		Before YCC		After YCC	
	Same Day	Next Day	Same Day	Next Day	Same Day	Next Day
0. Baseline	0.47 (0.18)	0.37 (0.23)	1.52 (0.59)	1.41 (0.68)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.13)
1. Narrower Bandwidth	0.54 (0.22)	0.43 (0.30)	1.96 (0.84)	1.96 (0.96)	-0.00 (0.09)	-0.13 (0.20)
2. Wider Bandwidth	0.40 (0.16)	0.35 (0.19)	1.28 (0.47)	1.05 (0.50)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.10)
3. Polynomial Order 2	0.52 (0.22)	0.43 (0.27)	1.81 (0.77)	1.75 (0.91)	0.07 (0.09)	0.01 (0.18)
4. Control Past Interventions	0.47 (0.23)	0.37 (0.31)	1.73 (0.76)	1.79 (0.90)	-0.06 (0.11)	-0.17 (0.21)
5. Control Past Stock Returns	0.47 (0.18)	0.37 (0.23)	1.53 (0.59)	1.43 (0.68)	0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.13)
6. Control Past 10-Year Yield	0.46 (0.17)	0.37 (0.23)	1.51 (0.60)	1.42 (0.69)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.13)
7. Drop Around the Cutoff Changes	0.37 (0.16)	0.28 (0.21)	1.12 (0.44)	0.91 (0.48)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.12)

**Table 1: Robustness**

*Notes:* Table 1 shows robustness checks against various modifications of our benchmark specifications. Panels A and B show the responses of stock prices and the JGB 10-year yield, respectively. In each panel, row 0 reports the baseline estimates. Row 1 considers bandwidth that is 50% less than the original one. Row 2 considers bandwidth that is 50% larger than the original one. Row 3 considers a local polynomial regression of order 2 instead of 1. Row 4 controls for the BoJ's stock purchases over the past two days. Row 5 controls for stock market returns over the past two days. Row 6 controls for changes in the 10-year yield over the past two days. Row 7 drops observations before and after one week around the cutoff changes. The same-day response indicates the changes in the outcome variable from 11AM to 3PM on the same day of the intervention. The next-day response indicates the changes in the outcome variable from 11AM on the day of the intervention to 9AM on the next day. Standard errors, which account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, are reported in parentheses.




the BoJ's interventions (e.g., because of behavioral heuristics among investors). For instance, if stock prices drop by more than 1% in the morning, investors may heuristically speculate a market rebound and adjust their portfolios accordingly, regardless of any potential BoJ actions. This kind of behavior introduces a separate, discontinuous reaction that coincides with the BoJ's intervention threshold, which could potentially confound our RDD estimates.

To address this concern, we conduct placebo tests by testing the presence of discontinuity in outcome variables around an arbitrary cutoff for which we do not expect to find any discontinuity. Specifically, for each value of placebo cutoffs  $c^{placebo} \in \{-1\%, -0.95\%, \dots, -0.05\%, 0\%\}$ , we test whether there is a discontinuity in our outcome variables when the stock prices fall below the placebo cutoff  $c^{placebo}$ . Namely, we estimate

$$\gamma_{l,h} \equiv \lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c^{placebo}} \mathbb{E}[\Delta y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c^{placebo}} \mathbb{E}[\Delta y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p], \quad (4)$$

where  $\Delta p_t$  is the percentage change in TOPIX in the morning session, and we focus on within-day changes (from 11AM to 3PM) in the outcome variables. Importantly, when estimating  $\gamma_{l,h}$ , we exclude periods for which the actual cutoff is identical to the placebo cutoff  $c^{placebo}$  under consideration. We are interested in the estimates of  $\gamma_{l,h}$ , and we expect that  $\gamma_{l,h}$  to be indistinguishable from zero for any value of  $c^{placebo}$ .

Figures 12A and 12B show the estimated values of  $\gamma_{l,h}$  across the placebo cutoffs, as well as the baseline estimates (red lines) obtained by using the true cutoff  $c_t$  instead of the placebo cutoff  $c^{placebo}$  in Equation (4): i.e.,  $\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[\Delta y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[\Delta y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p]$ . Reassuringly, while the baseline estimates are statistically significant, we find that the estimates of  $\gamma_{l,h}$  are indistinguishable from zero in almost all cases. Even in cases where the estimates are significant, they consistently exhibit the opposite sign compared to the baseline estimates. Moreover, in every case, the estimates deviate substantially from the baseline estimates that use the actual cutoff. These results strongly suggest that our results are indeed driven by the BoJ's policy intervention rather than by unrelated investor behavior.



**Figure 12: Placebo Tests**

Notes: Figure 12A plots the estimates of  $\gamma_{1,h}$  in equation (4) as the blue dots for each placebo cutoff, where the outcome variable is the stock price. The estimates are the response within the day of intervention (changes from 11AM to 3PM). We exclude the periods where the placebo cutoff coincides with the actual cutoff. The red line indicates our estimates using the actual cutoff. Figure 12B is analogous to Figure 12A, where the outcome variable is now the 10-year JGB yield. The line and the shaded area represent 90% confidence interval.

## 4.6 Other Discussion

We discuss several other issues. First, if the BoJ is selling the long-term government bonds at the same time as the stock purchases, then it is not surprising that the long-term interest rate rises in response to the stock purchases. However, during our sample periods, the BoJ sold government bonds only twice, on March 24, 2017, and March 23, 2020, both of which are the periods after yield curve control. Therefore, we can forcefully rule out the concern.

Second, one may wonder whether the difference in the amount of purchases across periods might be driving the heterogeneity before and after yield curve control. We first note that from a theoretical perspective, it is unlikely that the size of financial flow matters for whether its effect shows up in the bond market or the stock market. Second, Figure B.3 in the appendix shows that, while it is true that the absolute amount of purchases in each intervention is four times larger after the yield curve control than before, the growth is more moderate once expressed as a fraction of market capitalization. Finally, as we showed in Figure 10, there is a stark difference in the responses between shortly before and after the implementa-

tion of yield curve control. If the gradual increase in the amount of purchases are driving our results, one would expect the difference to be smooth over time.

The final issue concerns the interpretation of our results. As discussed by [Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen \(2011\)](#), there are broadly two channels through which central bank asset purchases affect asset prices. The first channel is the liquidity channel (or portfolio rebalancing channel). This channel operates by changing the aggregate demand and supply of assets. The second channel is the signaling channel. According to this channel, the central bank asset purchases have an effect because they send signals about the central bank's future policy stance. We believe that our empirical results are driven by the liquidity channel rather than the signaling channel. The BoJ announces the target amount of stock purchases each year in advance. Therefore, whether or not the BoJ purchases stocks today should not reveal the BoJ's future policy stance.

## 5 Structural Model

We lay out a theoretical model to provide structural interpretations of our empirical results. We consider a model with two assets: stocks and bonds. We do not make a distinction between money and bonds. Bonds include all money-like assets that are liquid and risk-free.<sup>13</sup> We show that a model with an inelastic stock market and an even more inelastic bond market can qualitatively and quantitatively account for our findings.

### 5.1 Environment

Time is discrete, and the horizon is infinite,  $t = 0, 1, \dots, \infty$ . The economy is populated by a representative household, a representative firm, investment funds, and a consolidated central bank and government. The only factor of production in the economy is capital in fixed supply, and firms own the capital. The supply of capital

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<sup>13</sup>This is a valid assumption if the elasticity of substitution between near-money assets like bonds and money is high, which is empirically the case ([Nagel, 2016](#); [Krishnamurthy and Li, 2023](#)).

is normalized to one, and a unit of capital produces  $Y$  units of consumption goods. We assume that  $Y$  is constant over time and is exogenously given.

There are two assets in the economy, stocks and bonds. Stocks are claims to capital (firms). Let  $Q_t$  denote the ex-dividend price of stocks. Its gross return is given by

$$R_{t+1}^s = \frac{Q_{t+1} + Y}{Q_t}. \quad (5)$$

There is also a risk-free asset in zero net supply. Its objective gross return is denoted as  $R_{t+1}^b$ . We assume only the government can issue bonds.

An investment fund manages a part of a household's wealth and invests in stocks and bonds. The fund consists of a continuum of members  $i \in [0, 1]$  with heterogenous beliefs over asset returns. Each member manages an equal amount of assets and invests in assets that they believe to have the highest return. A member  $i$  with belief shock  $\epsilon_i \equiv (\epsilon_i^b, \epsilon_i^s)$  at time  $t$  believes the return from investing in bonds and stocks are given  $\epsilon_i^b R_{t+1}^b$  and  $\epsilon_i^s R_{t+1}^s$ . Therefore the fraction of savings invested in asset  $a$ ,  $s_t^a$ , is given by the fraction of fund members that believe asset  $a$  has a higher return than the other:

$$s_t^a = \int_0^1 \mathbb{I} \left[ a = \arg \max_{\tilde{a}} \epsilon_i^{\tilde{a}} R_{t+1}^{\tilde{a}} \right] di, \quad (6)$$

where  $\mathbb{I}[\cdot]$  is an indicator function.

Building on the discrete choice literature, we assume the beliefs are drawn from independent type II extreme value (Fréchet) distribution:

$$\text{Prob} \left[ \epsilon_i^b \leq \epsilon^b, \epsilon_i^s \leq \epsilon^s \right] = \exp \left( - \sum_{a \in \{b, s\}} \mu^a (\epsilon^a)^{-\theta} \right), \quad (7)$$

where  $\mu^a$  is the scale parameter,  $\theta > 0$  is the shape parameter. The distribution of belief is independent across fund members and over time. Under the above

functional form assumptions, the portfolio shares of a fund are given by

$$s_t^a = \frac{\mu^a (R_{t+1}^a)^\theta}{\sum_{l \in \{s,b\}} \mu^l (R_{t+1}^l)^\theta} \quad \text{for } a \in \{b, s\}. \quad (8)$$

The asset demand system (8) takes constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, as in for example [Kojien and Yogo \(2020\)](#), which we micro-found through heterogeneous beliefs. We choose to microfound through heterogenous belief given the empirical evidence on the importance of belief in portfolio allocation ([Giglio et al., 2021](#)). However, the underlying microfoundation is not important as long as it delivers an inelastic portfolio choice. Other micro-foundations that lead to the same asset demand system include risks ([Okawa and Van Wincoop, 2012](#)), heterogeneous returns ([Kleinman et al., 2023](#)), and rational inattention ([Pellegrino et al., 2021](#)).

The parameter  $\theta > 0$  in equation (8) captures the elasticity of relative asset demand with respect to return differences. With our microfoundation,  $\theta$  has a structural interpretation as the inverse of belief heterogeneity. As belief heterogeneity vanishes,  $\theta \rightarrow \infty$ , the relative asset demand is infinitely elastic to return differences, a standard assumption in the macroeconomics literature. Given the portfolio share, the portfolio return of the fund is

$$R_{t+1}^p = \sum_a s_t^a R_{t+1}^a. \quad (9)$$

We assume households invest in bonds and the funds, but the funds are illiquid in the sense that households do not actively trade the funds. The households can freely trade bonds and we assume that the bonds provide liquidity services to the households in the form of utility. The household's preferences are given by

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ u(C_t) + v(B_t + s_t^b A_t) \right], \quad (10)$$

where  $C_t$  is the consumption,  $B_t$  is the direct bond holdings of the households,  $s_t^b A_t$  is the indirect bond holdings through the fund, and  $u(\cdot)$  and  $v(\cdot)$  are both

increasing and concave. Here we assumed that both the direct and indirect bond holding provide liquidity services. Although we do not provide a microfoundation of liquidity service that bond provides, existing literature (Angeletos et al., 2023; Auclert et al., 2024; Di Tella et al., 2024) show that models with uninsurable income or liquidity risk give representation that is similar to (10).

The household's budget constraint is given by

$$C_t + B_t = R_t^b B_{t-1} + D_t - T_t, \quad (11)$$

where  $T_t$  is the lump-sum tax imposed by the government and  $D_t$  is the withdrawal from the fund. The evolution of the account in the fund is

$$A_t = R_t^p A_{t-1} - D_t. \quad (12)$$

For simplicity, we assume the value that households maintain in the funds,  $A_t$ , follows an exogenous rule of the form

$$A_t = \kappa_0 + \kappa_1 Q_t, \quad (13)$$

where  $\kappa_0 > 0$  captures the amount of funds that households always maintain and  $\kappa_1 \in [0, 1]$  captures the response of funds value to asset price fluctuations. Abstracting away from modeling the household's optimal adjustment of illiquid funds greatly simplifies our analysis, and a similar approach is employed in Auclert et al. (2020). The household problem is to choose  $\{C_t, B_t\}$  to maximize (10) subject to (11). This results in the consumption Euler equation of the following form:

$$u'(C_t) = \beta R_{t+1}^b u'(C_{t+1}) + v'(B_t + s_t^b A_t). \quad (14)$$

We assume the government can issue bonds, invest in stocks, and levy taxes on households. The consolidated government sets the path of stock holdings,  $S_t^g$ , bond issuance  $B_t^g$ , and lump-sum tax,  $T_t$ , that satisfy the government budget con-

straint:

$$Q_t S_t^g - B_t^g = T_t + (Y + Q_t) S_{t-1}^g - R_t^b B_{t-1}^g. \quad (15)$$

The asset market clearing conditions

$$B_t^g = B_t + s_t^b A_t \quad (16)$$

$$Q_t = Q_t S_t^g + s_t^s A_t. \quad (17)$$

The goods market clearing,  $C_t = Y$ , is implied by the budget constraints, (11) and (15), and the asset market clearing conditions, (16) and (17).

Given the path of government policies,  $\{S_t^g, B_t^g, T_t\}$ , that satisfy (15), the equilibrium of this economy consists of  $\{\{s_t^a, R_{t+1}^a\}_{a \in \{s,b\}}, C_t, B_t, A_t, D_t, R_{t+1}^p, Q_t\}$  such that (5), (8)-(9), (11)-(14), and (16)-(17) hold. The steady-state equilibrium is the one where all variables are constant over time.

## 5.2 Central Bank Stock Purchases: Analytical Characterization

We first analytically study central bank stock purchases in the model. We assume before time  $t = 0$ , the economy is in the steady state, and we let all variables without time subscripts denote the steady-state values before  $t = 0$ . At time  $t = 0$ , we consider a shock to central bank stock purchases.

We model the central bank stock purchases as a small permanent increase in  $S_t^g$  at time 0. Therefore the path of  $S_t^g$  is given by  $S_t^g = S^g + dS^g$  for  $t \geq 0$ . We consider two scenarios that differ in how the stock purchases are financed. In the first experiment, the government finances the stock purchases with an equal amount of bond issuance,  $B_t^g = B^g + Q_0 dS^g$  for  $t \geq 0$ . This experiment aims to replicate the Bank of Japan's stock purchases before the implementation of yield curve control. In the second experiment, the government adjusts the path of  $\{B_t^g, T_t\}_{t \geq 0}$  so that the interest rate on the bond is kept constant,  $R_t^b = R^b$ . This experiment is to mimic the Bank of Japan's stock purchases after the implementation of yield curve control.

Our first characterization of the impact of the central bank stock purchases illustrates a relatively simple case highlighted in [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#).

**Proposition 1.** *Assume  $v''(B) = 0$ . Then, the central bank stock purchase with and without yield curve control has no effect on the bond interest rate,  $\frac{d \ln R_{t+1}^b}{d S^g} = 0$ , and raises the stock price for all  $t$ ,*

$$\frac{d \ln Q_t}{d S^g} = \frac{Q}{Q(1 - S^g - (1 - s^b)\kappa_1) + A\theta(1 - s^b)s^b \frac{Y}{Y+Q}} > 0. \quad (18)$$

All the proofs are collected in Appendix [C.1](#). When the marginal utility from liquidity service that the bond provides is constant,  $v'(B) = \bar{v}$ , the household's consumption Euler equation (14), together with goods market clearing,  $C_t = Y$ , solely pins down the bond interest rate  $R^b$ . That is, the bond market is perfectly elastic. Note that the expression (18) can be rewritten as  $\frac{dQ_t}{Q dS^g}$ , so has an interpretation as the dollar increase in stock market value in response to \$1 increase in central bank's stock holdings. Note that  $\frac{d \ln Q_t}{d S^g} \rightarrow 0$  as the belief heterogeneity vanishes,  $\theta \rightarrow \infty$ . This is the case where the stock market is also perfectly elastic, under which the central bank asset purchases are entirely neutral ([Wallace, 1981](#)).

With finite  $\theta$ , the stock market is inelastic. Since the central bank stock purchases create excess demand for stocks, the stock return must fall to clear the stock market, which results in a rise in the stock price. With a perfectly elastic bond market, this is the only consequence of a flow into the stock market, as in [Gabaix and Koijen \(2021\)](#). As a result, this simple case fails to account for our empirical findings that interest rates respond strongly to central bank stock purchases.

To explain our empirical findings, we consider a more general case where the bonds provide liquidity services,  $v''(B) < 0$ . The asset returns and prices can be obtained from (14), (16), and (17) together with (8), (5) and (13). Since these equations do not involve any state variable, there are no transition dynamics, and therefore we drop the time subscript. After substituting goods market clearing,  $C_t = Y$ , and (16) into (14), we obtain

$$u'(Y) = \beta R^b u'(Y) + v'(B^g), \quad (19)$$



which pins down the bond interest rate given the bond supply,  $B^g$ . Substituting (8) into (17) and noting  $s_t^s = 1 - s_t^b$ , we have

$$Q = QS^g + (1 - s^b) [\kappa_0 + \kappa_1 Q]. \quad (20)$$

Since  $s^b$  is a function of  $R^b$  and  $Q$ , the two equations (19) and (20) fully characterize two unknowns,  $Q$  and  $R^b$ . Solving the two equations gives the following results without yield curve control ( $dB^g = QdS^g$ ).

**Proposition 2.** *Assume  $v''(B) < 0$ . Without yield curve control, the central bank stock purchases raise both the bond interest rate,*

$$\frac{dR^b}{dS^g} = \frac{-v''(B^g)}{\beta u'(Y)} > 0, \quad (21)$$

*and the effect on stock price is ambiguous:*

$$\frac{d \ln Q}{dS^g} = Q \frac{1 + \frac{v''(B^g)}{u'(Y)} A \theta s^b (1 - s^b)}{\left[ (1 - S^g - \kappa_1 (1 - s^b)) Q + A \theta s^b (1 - s^b) \frac{Y}{Y+Q} \right]}. \quad (22)$$

The proposition shows that when the demand for bonds is downward sloping,  $v''(B) < 0$ , the central bank stock purchases financed with the issuance of bonds (central bank reserves) raise the bond interest rate. When the central increases the supply of bonds, the bonds are in excess supply. With an inelastic bond market, a rise in the bond interest rate is required to clear the bond market. This result is qualitatively consistent with our empirical finding that central bank stock purchases without yield curve control raise the bond interest rates. Moreover, expression (21) shows that how much the bond interest rate responds relative to the stock price is governed by the degree to which bond demand slopes down,  $|v''(B)|$ .

The rise in interest rates puts downward pressure on the stock price response because it discourages investment in stocks. Equation (22) shows that a higher value of  $|v''(B)|$  dampens or even reverses the stock price response. We say the bond market is more inelastic relative to the stock market whenever  $v''(B^g)/u'(Y) < -\frac{1}{A \theta s^b (1 - s^b)}$  so that a flow from bonds to stocks lowers the stock price. This is what

we will find in our calibration exercise below.

We next turn to the case with yield curve control.

**Proposition 3.** *Assume  $v''(B) < 0$ . With yield curve control, the central bank stock purchases have no effect on the bond interest rate and raise the stock price. The size of the stock price response is given by (18) and is larger than without yield curve control.*

The fact that there is no effect on the bond interest rate is by construction. The next part of the proposition establishes that the size of the stock price response is larger relative to the case without yield curve control. This is because when the interest rate does not rise, a further fall in stock return is required to clear the stock market, which results in a further rise in stock price. This result is qualitatively consistent with our empirical finding that after the introduction of yield curve control, we tend to see a more robust rise in the stock price in response to the central bank stock purchases.

### 5.3 Central Bank Stock Purchases: Model vs. Data

The previous results highlight that our model is at least qualitatively consistent with the empirical evidence we document. We now explore the model's ability to account for the data quantitatively. Throughout, we work with a first-order approximation around the steady state.

We summarize the calibration of baseline parameters in Table 2. We calibrate our model to the Japanese economy at an annual frequency, although the frequency is irrelevant since our model does not have transitional dynamics. We normalize the output in the economy to one,  $Y \equiv 1$ . The household discount factor is set to  $\beta = 0.86$ , a value consistent with the average annual discount rate of 14% reported in Kureishi et al. (2021). We set the steady-state supply of bond to 150% of output,  $B^s = 1.5$ . This corresponds to the stock of Japanese government bonds averaged over the period 2010-2020, which we obtained from the Ministry of Finance website. The steady-state value of government stock holding is set to zero,  $S^s = 0$ . The degree to which a fund's value responds to the stock price is set

to one,  $\kappa_1 = 1$ . Since the output is constant, we can normalize  $u'(Y) \equiv 1$  without loss of generality. We parameterize the bond in utility as  $v(B) = \bar{v} \frac{B^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta}$ .

We then choose the three parameters  $\{\bar{v}, s^b, \kappa_0\}$  to exactly match the following three moments:<sup>14</sup> (i) the household liquid wealth as a share of the total household wealth ( $B/(A+B)$ ) of 10% obtained from 2014 and 2019 waves of the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure,<sup>15</sup> (ii) the average net long-term interest rate of 0.4 p.p. during the period 2010-2020, (iii) the average stock return of 11 p.p. during the period 2010-2020. The latter two are obtained from the macro history database (Jordà et al., 2019).

Finally, we choose two parameters  $\Theta \equiv (\eta, \theta)$ , the parameters that govern the stock market and bond market inelasticity, to best fit our empirical estimates of stock price response to the central bank stock purchases with and without yield curve control and the interest rate response to the central bank stock purchases without yield curve control, which we denote in a vector format as  $\alpha \equiv [\alpha_Q, \alpha_Q^{YCC}, \alpha_{R^b}]$ , and its model counterpart under the parameter  $\Theta$  is denoted as  $\alpha(\Theta) \equiv [\alpha_Q(\Theta), \alpha_Q^{YCC}(\Theta), \alpha_{R^b}(\Theta)]$ . Formally, we set  $\Theta$  at the solution of the following problem

$$\hat{\Theta} = \arg \min_{\Theta} (\alpha(\Theta) - \alpha)' \Sigma^{-1} (\alpha(\Theta) - \alpha), \quad (23)$$

where  $\Sigma$  is the weighting matrix. For  $\alpha$ , we use the next day response reported in the baseline row of Table 1, and we set  $\Sigma$  as a diagonal matrix containing the variance of our estimates in each element. We obtain  $\eta = 13.7$  with a standard error of 0.86 and  $\theta = 2.9$  with a standard error of 1.8, where standard errors are computed using the asymptotic covariance matrix of  $\Theta$ ,  $\frac{\partial \alpha(\Theta)}{\partial \Theta}' \Sigma^{-1} \frac{\partial \alpha(\Theta)}{\partial \Theta}$ . Since two parameters are calibrated to fit three moments, the parameters are over-identified.

Table 3 shows the calibrated model can quantitatively replicate the impact of central bank stock purchases we have estimated. The baseline model in row 1 replicates the rise in interest rate and a fall in stock price in response to the central bank stock purchases without yield curve control as well as the rise in stock price

<sup>14</sup>Calibrating  $s^b$  is equivalent to calibrating  $\mu^b / \mu^s$ .

<sup>15</sup>We define the checking and saving accounts as liquid wealth. We take the average of the 2014 and 2019 waves.

Parameter	Description	Value	Source/Target
$\beta$	Discount factor	0.86	Kureishi et al. (2021)
$B^g$	Supply of bonds	1.5	Outstanding bonds to GDP
$\kappa_1$	Fund's wealth slope	1.0	—
$\kappa_0$	Fund's wealth intercept	0.4	Liquid wealth share
$s^b$	Fund's bond portfolio share	0.05	Stock return
$\bar{v}$	Bond convenience yield coefficient	35.5	Bond interest rate
$\eta$	Bond convenience yield curvature	13.7	Match estimates
$\theta$	Fund's portfolio elasticity	2.9	Match estimates

**Table 2:** Calibration of Baseline Parameters

	Stock price response		Interest rate response	
	No YCC	YCC	No YCC	YCC
0. Data	-16.95 (26.27)	22.23 (11.13)	1.41 (0.68)	0.00 (0.13)
1. Baseline Model	-12.72	16.81	1.45	0.00
2. Elastic bond market ( $\eta = 0$ )	16.81	16.81	0.00	0.00
3. Elastic stock market ( $\theta = \infty$ )	-29.52	0.00	1.45	0.00
4. Elastic stock & bond market	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

**Table 3:** Central Bank Stock Purchases: Model vs. Data

*Notes:* The table reports the response of stock price and the interest rate to the central bank stock purchases,  $\frac{dQ}{QdS^g}$  and  $\frac{dR^b}{dS^g}$ , both in the data and in the model. The data is taken from the baseline rows of Table 1 with standard errors in parenthesis.

with yield curve control. This is because our calibration features a bond market that is more inelastic than the stock market. As is made precise in Proposition 2, when  $v''(B^g) < -\frac{u'(Y)}{A\theta s^b(1-s^b)}$ , which is our calibration, the stock price falls in response to the central bank stock purchases without yield curve control. This does not mean the stock market is elastic. In fact, when yield curve control is in place, so that the bond market is effectively elastic, the stock price shows a strong response. Quantitatively our model implies that a flow into the stock market of \$1 leads to a rise in the stock market value of \$16.81, which is roughly in line with our empirical estimates of \$22.23. This is several times larger than the baseline estimates of Gabaix and Koijen (2021), which shows a stock price response of \$5 to \$1 inflow.

In row 2, we contrast the baseline model with a model with an elastic bond market ( $\eta = 0$ ). With an elastic bond market, the interest rate shows no response by construction and the stock price responds exactly in the same way with and without yield curve control. As explained in Proposition 1, this is because the households' Euler equation pins down the bond interest rate, irrespective of financial flows. As a result, the impact of flows is entirely absorbed by the stock prices. In row 3, we show that a model with an elastic stock market is unable to explain the substantial positive response of stock price under yield curve control. With a perfectly elastic stock market, the stock return keeps track of the bond interest rate one-for-one. Since the yield curve control fixes the bond interest rate, the stock price does not respond either. Finally, in row 4, a model in which both the bond and the stock market are perfectly elastic predicts no effect from the central bank stock purchases. As mentioned in Proposition 1, this is the case where the central bank balance sheet is neutral (Wallace, 1981). Rows 2-4 are all inconsistent with our empirical findings, leading us to reject models in which either the stock market or the bond market, or both, are elastic.

Our model highlights the importance of jointly taking into account stock and bond markets, even when researchers are only interested in the inelasticity of one market. Existing attempts to estimate inelasticity in the stock market typically either ignore the bond market or assume that bond markets are perfectly elastic.

	Baseline	Re-estimated
	(1)	(2)
Portfolio elasticity, $\theta$	2.9	15.1
Bond inelasticity, $\eta$	13.7	0.0

**Table 4:** Re-estimated Parameters Ignoring Inelasticity in Bond Market

*Notes:* In column (1), we report the baseline parameter estimates of  $(\theta, \eta)$ . In column (2), we re-estimate parameter  $\theta$  to match 8.65% stock price response over the whole sample period (row 0 and column 2 of Table 1), assuming the bond market is elastic,  $\eta = 0$ .

We argue such estimates substantially understate the true inelasticity in the stock market. To make this point, we re-estimate our model by assuming researchers misspecify that the bond market is perfectly elastic ( $\eta = 0$ ). We estimate portfolio elasticity parameter  $\theta$  by targeting 8.65% stock price response from the overall sample period (row 0 and column 2 of Table 1).<sup>16</sup>

Table 4 shows the re-estimated estimates along with our baseline estimates. We find a portfolio elasticity of 15.1, which is five times larger than our baseline estimates. This means that failing to take into account for inelasticity in the bond market leads researchers to substantially underestimate the true inelasticity in the stock market (overestimate the true elasticity). This provides empirical support for the theoretical arguments in Fuchs et al. (2023) that taking into account cross-asset spillovers is crucial to uncover the true elasticity in the asset market.

While we focused on a particular structural model here, our empirical results provide two broader insights into theoretical models that incorporate inelastic financial markets. First, a strong response of the yield curve in times with flexible adjustments challenges the implicit assumption in the existing literature that the bond market is more elastic relative to the stock market. Second, the response of stock prices under the yield curve control is four times higher than the estimates in Gabaix and Koijen (2021), suggesting that the stock market may be more inelastic than previously thought. We failed to detect it in times with flexible interest rate adjustments because it was masked by the presence of an even more inelastic bond

<sup>16</sup>If researchers misspecify the bond markets are elastic, there is no reason to expect stock price responses to be different before and after YCC. The natural choice for such researchers is to pool the whole sample period.

market.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

How does a flow into the stock market impact the financial market? To answer this question, we exploit the discontinuities in the Bank of Japan's policy rule. We empirically show that central bank stock purchases have a far-reaching impact on the financial market. In normal times, the long-term interest rate is the main absorber of the intervention, while the impact on stock price is noisy zero. When yield curve control – another unconventional monetary policy – is implemented simultaneously, the stock price, rather than the long-term interest rate, becomes the main absorber of the central bank stock purchase. Through the lens of the model, we argue that, while these results support the notion that the stock market is inelastic, taking into account an even more inelastic bond market is crucial to account for our empirical findings. Our empirical and theoretical results provide an important caveat in estimating the inelasticity in the stock market. We argue that failing to take into account inelasticity in the bond market understates the true inelasticity in the stock market by a factor of five.

We suggest two directions for future research. First, like many other empirical studies, the external validity of our results remains an open question. A natural next step would be to systematically assess whether and how much of our conclusions carry over to countries outside of Japan. Second, while our model assumed exogenous output, endogenizing output is necessarily to assess broader macroeconomic implications of central bank stock purchases.

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# Appendix

## A Empirical Appendix

### A.1 Local Nonlinear Impulse Response Function

In this section, we allow nonlinearity in the impulse response and show that our estimands can be interpreted as dynamic “local average treatment effect” in the spirit of [Angrist and Imbens \(1995\)](#).

We first define a potential outcome framework in our context following [Rambachan and Shephard \(2021\)](#). For each  $t \geq 1$ , the BoJ decides the amount of ETF purchases  $ETF_t$  and let us denote  $ETF_{1:t} \equiv (ETF_1, \dots, ETF_t)$ . Let  $w_{1:t} \equiv (w_1, \dots, w_t)$  be a potential assignment path up to  $t$  where  $w_t \in [0, \bar{w}]$  for all  $t$ . Associated with this potential assignment path, the potential outcome at day  $t + l$  time  $h$  is  $Y_{t+l,h}(w_{1:t+l})$ .<sup>17</sup> Note that for any different assignment paths, there exist different outcome paths but we only observe  $Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{1:t+l})$ . For any day  $t + l$  time  $h$ , let us denote

$$Y_{t+l,h}(w) \equiv Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{1:t-1}, \underbrace{w}_{t-th}, ETF_{t+1:t+l}).$$

Using this notation, the observed outcome can be denoted as  $Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_t)$  by definition.

We assume that the BoJ’s ETF purchasing policy rule takes the following form, in which the amount of ETF purchase at time  $t$ ,  $ETF_t$ , is given by

$$ETF_t = ETF_{-,t}(\Delta p_t)\mathbb{I}(\Delta p_t < c_t) + ETF_{+,t}(\Delta p_t)\mathbb{I}(\Delta p_t \geq c_t), \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where  $\Delta p_t$  is the log-changes in the TOPIX value in the morning,  $c_t$  is the cut-off, and  $ETF_{-,t}$  and  $ETF_{+,t}$  are random functions of  $\Delta p_t$  which represent different

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<sup>17</sup>We assume that the potential outcome depends only on past and contemporaneous assignments. [Rambachan and Shephard \(2021\)](#) called this assumption Non-anticipating potential outcomes.

policy rules depending on whether  $\Delta p_t$  is above or below the cutoff at time  $t$ . The following assumptions guarantee that our estimands identify the dynamic local average treatment effect.

**Assumption 1.** (i)  $Y_{t+l,h}(w)$  is bounded and continuously differentiable in  $w \in [0, \bar{w}]$  with probability one and, (ii)  $ETF_{-,t}(\Delta p)$  and  $ETF_{+,t}(\Delta p)$  are bounded and continuous at  $c_t$  with probability one.

**Assumption 2 (Monotonicity).**  $ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t)$  with probability one.

**Assumption 3 (Relevance).**  $\int \Pr(ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t) | \Delta p_t = c_t) dw > 0$ .

**Assumption 4 (Local Independence).** For each  $t + l$  and  $h$ , there exists a neighborhood  $N_{t+l,h}$  of  $c_t$  such that  $\Delta p_t \perp (\{Y_{t+l,h}(w)\}_w, ETF_{-,t}(c_t), ETF_{+,t}(c_t)) | \Delta p_t \in N_{t+l,h}$ .

**Theorem 1.** If Assumptions 1-4 hold, then

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p]}{\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t | \Delta p_t = \Delta p]} \\ &= \int \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\partial Y_{t+l,h}(w)}{\partial w} \mid \Delta p_t = c_t, ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t)\right] \bar{\omega} dw, \end{aligned}$$

where  $\bar{\omega} = \Pr(ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t) | \Delta p_t = c_t) / \int \Pr(ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t) | \Delta p_t = c_t) dw$ .

*Proof.* First, observe that

$$\begin{aligned} \lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] &= \lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{-,t}(\Delta p)) | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{-,t}(c_t)) | \Delta p_t = c_t], \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] &= \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{+,t}(\Delta p)) | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{+,t}(c_t)) | \Delta p_t = c_t],\end{aligned}$$

follow from Assumptions 1 and 4. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned}&\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] \\ &= \mathbb{E}[Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{-,t}(c_t)) - Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{+,t}(c_t)) | \Delta p_t = c_t] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[\int \frac{\partial Y_{t+l,h}(w)}{\partial w} \mathbb{I}\{ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t)\} dw | \Delta p_t = c_t\right] \\ &= \int \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{\partial Y_{t+l,h}(w)}{\partial w} | \Delta p_t = c_t, ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t)\right] \\ &\quad \times \Pr(ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t) | \Delta p_t = c_t) dw,\end{aligned}$$

where second equality follows from Assumptions 1 and 3, and the third equality follows from 1. Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned}&\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_t | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] \\ &= \int \Pr(ETF_{-,t}(c_t) \geq w \geq ETF_{+,t}(c_t) | \Delta p_t = c_t) dw,\end{aligned}$$

and Assumption 2 guarantees that the denominator is positive. Combining these, we have the stated result.  $\square$

Since  $Y_{t+l,h}(w) \equiv Y_{t+l,h}(ETF_{1:t-1}, w, ETF_{t+1:t+l})$ , the local independence assumption requires that falling below the cutoff at day  $t$  is not correlated with the future or past ETF purchases. We test this in Appendix [A.4](#).

## A.2 Details on Cutoff Estimation

We first split the sample based on six announcements by the BoJ that publicized changes in the target amount of ETF purchases on April 4, 2013, October 31, 2014,

December 18, 2015, July 29, 2016, July 31, 2018, and March 16, 2020. We then divide each sample based on whether TOPIX value falls below zero for the past two consecutive days. For the case with consecutive drops in the past two days, we further split on April 1, 2019, for the reason that we describe below.

In each sample split, we proceed as follows. We take grid points for the cutoff candidates from -1% to 0% with 0.05% interval,  $\mathbb{C} = \{-1.0\%, -0.95\%, \dots, -0.05\%, 0.0\%\}$ . For each of  $c \in \mathbb{C}$ , we estimate the following linear probability model separately on both sides of the candidate cutoff,  $c$ :

$$\Pr_{-,t}(ETF_t > 0 | \Delta p_t) = \begin{cases} \alpha_- + \beta_- \Delta p_t & \text{for } \Delta p_t \in [c - k, c] \\ \alpha_+ + \beta_+ \Delta p_t & \text{for } \Delta p_t \in [c, c + k] \end{cases}, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where we take the bandwidth to be 1% around the cutoff,  $k = 1\%$ . Given the estimates, we can compute the jump around the cutoff as follows:

$$J_t(c) \equiv \lim_{\Delta p \uparrow \bar{c}} \widehat{\Pr}_t(ETF_t > 0 | \Delta p) - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow \bar{c}} \widehat{\Pr}_t(ETF_t > 0 | \Delta p),$$

where  $\widehat{\Pr}_t$  denote the fitted value of equation (A.2). We select the cutoff that maximizes square of the jump:

$$c_t^* \in \arg \max_{c \in \mathbb{C}} J_t^2(c).$$

Whenever there is a tie, we choose the largest cutoff.

Table B.2 shows the estimated cutoff, and Table B.3 shows the discontinuity in the probability of the Bank of Japan's intervention around the estimated cutoff. As argued in the main text, the estimated cutoffs align well with what is commonly argued among media. The discontinuity around the cutoff is always over 50%, is often over 80%, and they are highly statistically significant. We made a choice to split the sample with consecutive drops in the past two days on April 1, 2019, because there was an apparent change in the cutoff around this period. If we do not split the sample at this point in time, the resulting discontinuity is -0.744 . If we split the sample, the discontinuity is -1.000 in the first half, and it is -0.853 in the second half of the sample. This choice does not materially affect any of our



empirical results.

Figure B.1 graphically displays the discontinuity in the probability of intervention for each period. While the magnitude of discontinuity is more apparent in the beginning and the end of the sample period, the sharp discontinuity shows up in all subsamples.

### A.3 Manipulation Test

A typical concern in regression discontinuity-based identification strategies is manipulation (McCrary, 2008). We first note that this concern is unlikely in our context since there is little room for investors to precisely manipulate the stock price index. Having said this, we formally test the presence of manipulation by examining the continuity of the density function of TOPIX changes in the morning. We estimate the density function using the local polynomial density estimator by Cattaneo et al. (2020) and test the presence of discontinuity around our estimated cutoff.

Figure 4 shows the estimated density and histogram, and Table B.4 reports the estimates and test statistics for discontinuity. While there is a small mass on the right side of the cutoff, the p-value of testing the discontinuity is 0.447. Therefore, there is no statistical evidence of manipulation.

### A.4 (Dis)continuity of ETF Purchases across Days

In this section, we argue that the effects we are identifying are the effects of a one-time shock of ETF purchases. As discussed in A.1,  $y_{t+l,h}$  is clearly affected by the BoJ's ETF purchases up to  $l$  days later. Therefore, if falling below the cutoff today is correlated with future and past purchases, our empirical estimates cannot be interpreted as the causal effect of one-time BoJ ETF purchases (Rambachan and Shephard, 2021). In order to address this concern, we estimate the discontinuity in the amount of ETF purchases around the cutoff across days. Formally, we estimate

the following term,

$$\lim_{\Delta p \uparrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_{t+l} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p] - \lim_{\Delta p \downarrow c_t} \mathbb{E}[ETF_{t+l} | \Delta p_t = \Delta p]. \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Figure B.2 shows the estimates of discontinuity in the amount of ETF purchases at date  $t + l$  around  $\Delta p_t = c_t$ . Reassuringly, we find significant discontinuity only at  $l = 0$ . Therefore, our identified effects are the causal effects of one-time BoJ's ETF purchases and are not contaminated by future or past ETF purchases.

## B Additional Tables and Figures

**Table B.1:** Major Announcements by the BoJ

Date	Announcement
October 28, 2010	Intention to purchase 450 billion yen of ETFs
October 30, 2012	Intention to purchase 2.1 trillion yen of ETFs annually
October 31, 2014	Annual purchase target increased to 3 trillion yen
December 18, 2015	Annual purchases target increased to 3.3 trillion yen
July 29, 2016	Annual purchases target increased to 6 trillion yen
March 16, 2020	Annual purchases target increased to 12 trillion yen

*Notes:* Table B.1 shows the six major announcements by the BoJ regarding the target ETF purchase amounts. Source: Fukuda and Tanaka (2022).

**Table B.2:** Estimated Cutoff

No Consecutive Drops		Consecutive Drops	
Period	Cutoff	Period	Cutoff
2010/12/15 - 2013/04/03	-1%	2010/12/15 - 2013/04/03	-1%
2013/04/04 - 2014/10/30	-0.35%	2013/04/04 - 2014/10/30	0%
2014/10/31 - 2015/12/17	-0.15%	2014/10/31 - 2015/12/17	0%
2015/12/18 - 2016/07/28	-0.4%	2015/12/18 - 2016/07/28	0%
2016/07/29 - 2018/07/30	-0.3%	2016/07/29 - 2018/07/30	0%
2018/07/31 - 2020/03/15	-0.5%	2018/07/31 - 2020/03/15	-0.25%
2020/03/16 - 2020/12/31	-0.5%	2020/03/16 - 2020/12/31	-0.25%

*Notes:* Table B.2 shows the estimated cutoff for each of the subsamples.

**Table B.3:** Discontinuity in Probability of Intervention around the Estimated Cut-off


	No Consecutive Drops			Consecutive Drops		
	Discontinuity estimates	Sample size Left	Right	Discontinuity estimates	Sample size Left	Right
2010/12/15 - 2013/04/03	-1.011 (0.012)	43	158	-1.000 (0.000)	15	47
2013/04/04 - 2014/10/30	-0.576 (0.100)	60	146	-0.931 (0.072)	25	30
2014/10/31 - 2015/12/17	-0.683 (0.099)	72	98	-1.122 (0.117)	11	17
2015/12/18 - 2016/07/28	-0.811 (0.119)	20	36	-1.000 (0.000)	8	11
2016/07/29 - 2018/07/30	-0.604 (0.069)	78	243	-0.945 (0.053)	40	33
2018/07/31 - 2020/03/15	-0.978 (0.022)	49	163	-0.744 (0.130)	30	34
2020/03/16 - 2020/12/31	-0.930 (0.070)	29	71	-0.985 (0.022)	13	14

*Notes:* Table B.3 shows the discontinuity in the probability of the BoJ intervention around the estimated cutoff. We estimate the discontinuity using the local linear regression with bandwidth 1% around the cutoff and uniform kernel. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.


**Table B.4:** Density Discontinuity Test

	Density estimates		Discontinuity test	
	Left	Right	Difference	p-value
	0.423 ( 0.065 )	0.506 ( 0.067 )	0.083 ( 0.093 )	0.373
Sample size	667	1790		
Bandwidth	0.512	0.512		
Effective sample size	358	719		

*Notes:* Table B.4 reports the density estimates on the left and the right of the cutoff and test statistics for the discontinuity test. We use the local polynomial density estimator by Cattaneo et al. (2020) with order 2. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.




**Figure B.1:** Discontinuity in the Probability of the BoJ Intervention for each Period  
*Notes:* Figure B.1 shows the discontinuity in the probability of the BoJ intervention around the estimated cutoff for each period. The blue scatter plot is the binned scatter plot with bin width 0.1%, and the red line indicates the LOESS fit with the shaded gray area being the 95% confidence interval.




**Figure B.2:** (Dis)continuity of ETF Purchases across Days

Notes: Figure B.2 shows the estimates of (A.3) across days. The shaded areas represent 90% confidence intervals, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.



**Figure B.3:** The Amount of the BoJ Purchases

Notes: Figure B.3 plots the amount of stock purchases by the BoJ in each intervention. Figure B.3A shows the absolute amount of purchases in billion Japanese Yen (approximately 10 million US dollars). B.3B express it as a fraction of market capitalization.



**Figure B.4: Robustness to Bandwidth Selection**

*Notes:* Figure B.4 shows the robustness of our estimates with respect to the size of the bandwidth. Each dot represents the point estimates of the response from 11AM of the intervention day to 9AM on the next day. The vertical line represents the 90% confidence interval, which accounts for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The dashed green line is the optimal bandwidth proposed by [Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik \(2014\)](#), which is our benchmark. Figures B.4A and B.4B show the response of stock price before and after YCC, respectively. Figures B.4C and B.4D show the response of 10-year JGB yield before and after YCC, respectively.



## C Theory Appendix

### C.1 Proofs

#### C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1

The household's Euler equation (14) together with goods market clearing conditions  $C_t = Y$  and constant  $v'(B) = \bar{v}$  imply

$$R^b \equiv (1 - \bar{v}/u'(Y)) / \beta \quad \text{for all } t. \quad (\text{C.1})$$

This immediately implies that the bond interest rate is invariant to central bank stock purchases. The stock price  $Q_t$  solve (17):

$$Q_t = Q_t S_t^g + \frac{\mu^s(R_{t+1}^s)^\theta}{\sum_a \mu^a(R_{t+1}^a)^\theta} [\kappa_0 + \kappa_1 Q_t] \quad (\text{C.2})$$

with  $R_{t+1}^b = R^b$  and

$$R_{t+1}^s = (Q_{t+1} + Y) / Q_t. \quad (\text{C.3})$$

Totally differentiating (C.2),

$$Q d \ln Q_t = Q S^g d \ln Q_t + Q d S_0^g + s^s (1 - s^s) A \theta d \ln R_{t+1}^s + s^s \kappa_1 Q d \ln Q_t, \quad (\text{C.4})$$

and totally differentiating (C.3),

$$d \ln R_{t+1}^s = \frac{1}{R^s} d \ln Q_{t+1} - d \ln Q_t. \quad (\text{C.5})$$

Since these equations do not involve any state variable and the shocks are permanent, there are no transition dynamics,  $d \ln Q_{t+1} = d \ln Q_t \equiv d \ln Q$ . Imposing this, we can solve (C.4) and (C.5) to obtain

$$\frac{d \ln Q}{d S^g} = \frac{Q}{Q(1 - S^g - s^s \kappa_1) + (1 - s^b) s^b A \theta \frac{Y}{Y+Q}} > 0, \quad (\text{C.6})$$

as desired.

### C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2

Linearizing (19) yields

$$\beta R^b d \ln R^b = -\frac{v''(B^g)}{u'(Y)} dB^g. \quad (\text{C.7})$$

Linearizing (20) yields

$$\left[ (1 - S^g - \kappa_1 s^s)Q + A\theta s^b(1 - s^b)\frac{Y}{Y+Q} \right] d \ln Q = QdS^g - A\theta s^b(1 - s^b)d \ln R^b. \quad (\text{C.8})$$

Plug (C.7) into (C.8) to obtain

$$d \ln Q = \frac{1}{\left[ (1 - S^g - \kappa_1(1 - s^b))Q + A\theta s^b(1 - s^b)\frac{Y}{Y+Q} \right]} \left( QdS^g + \frac{v''(B^g)}{u'(Y)} A\theta s^b(1 - s^b)dB^g \right).$$

The statement in the propositions follows after imposing  $dB^g = QdS^g$ .

### C.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3

The proposition follows from expression (C.8) after imposing  $d \ln R^b = 0$ .